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PLEADING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS:
WHEAT AND CHAFF
by
LAWRENCE W. MOORE, SJ.*
I have heard almost audible sighs of relief as I have traced the history
of pleadings to first-year students in Civil Procedure. Most textbooks' give
students an abbreviated sketch of the complications of common law
pleadings followed by an indication of the problems that remained after
the Field Code reform. The call of the federal rules for "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'"
produces the sighs of relief. Although there are a few explicit exceptions'
to the "short and plain" standard in the federal rules, the students' first
impression is that modern pleading rules in federal courts are reasonable
and simple.
It comes as a surprise' that federal courts require that several types
of complaints 6 including civil rights7 (encompassing employment
discriminations) complaints, must be pleaded with specificity and parti-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana; LL.M., New York Univer-
sity (1982); J.D., University of Missouri, Kansas City (1981); M. Div., Jesuit School of Theology at
Berkeley (1977); M.A., Saint Louis University (1972); A.B., Saint Louis University (1970). The author
thanks David P. Curlin, Keene R. Kelley and Tracy Weese for their research assistance.
1E.g, J. CotmN, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MnaLER & J. SEXTON, CIIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS
420-76 (5th ed. 1989) [hereinafter J. CouND]; J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE
347-94 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter J. LANDERS].
' Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings, and Proceedings of the Courts of the State,
ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. The key problem under code pleadings is to discover ultimate facts
somewhere between the Scylla of legal conclusions and the Charybdis of mere evidence.
Before the era of modern pleading ushered in by the promulgation of the rules in 1938,
a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint had to plead facts which if
true showed that his legal rights had been invaded. The problem was that without
pretrial discovery, which ordinarily could not be conducted before the complaint was
filed, the plaintiff might not know enough facts to be able to make the required showing.
American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 8(aX2).
4 E.g, id. 9(a) (fraud and mistake); id. 9(g) (special damages).
' Student hornbooks relegate discussion of the civil rights pleadings requirement to footnotes.
J. FRIEDEN rrAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CInL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 256 n.1 (1985); C. WmGHT, THE
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 447 n.41 (4th ed. 1983). The textbooks are a bit more forthcoming.
J. CouND, supra note 1, at 493-95; J. LANDERS, supra note 1, at 415-21.
6 Federal courts commonly require that securities fraud and conspiracy also be pleaded with
specificity. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLum.
L. REv. 433, 447-50 (1986).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981-1986 (1982).
8 Id. § 2003-2 (1982).
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cularity. Such a requirement is without basis in the federal rules9 or in
Supreme Court decisions.0 Although a leading treatise denies the ex-
istence of such a requirement," it is firmly embedded in the jurisprudence
of the circuits' s The existence of such a gloss on the federal rules has
received only sporadic comment. 3 As one author commented, "[i]t is the
utter silence in which the process is taking place."'
14
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, there will be a brief survey
of the opinions that have required specificity in pleading civil rights com-
plaints. Courts ought to speak for themselves before being criticized. The
second part will evaluate the reasons federal courts provide for this
requirement.
REASONS
From the hundreds of reported cases requiring specificity in pleading
civil rights complaints, the surprising fact is that courts have rarely stated
reasons for the requirement. 5 Such paucity of reasoning or justification
would not be surprising once a rule becomes well established, but the
lack of reasoning is found even as the courts developed the rule.
The most quoted early justification for requiring specificity in pleading
civil rights complaints is found in the district court opinion of Valley v.
Maule.!6
Only rarely do courts admit that they created the particularity requirement. "Defendant's
counsel, like many similarly situated, pumps too much air into the judicial requirement that civil
rights actions should be pleaded with particularity." Bey v. Schneider Sheet Metal, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
319, 324 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (emphasis added).
'0 "Santa Fe contends that petitioners were required to plead with 'particularity' the degree
of similarity between their culpability in the alleged theft and the involvement of the favored
coemployee, Jackson. This assertion, apparently not made below, too narrowly constricts the role
of pleadings" McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails Transp. Co., 427 US. 273, 283 n.11 (1976).
1"[Normal pleadings standards apply to civil rights actions." 5 C. WmIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1230, at 49 (Supp. 1989). They do proceed to list cases
taking the opposite view. For a rare recent case denying a specificity requirement, see McNair v.
McMickens, 115 F.R.D. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Claimed violations of civil rights, unlike claims
of fraud, for example, are not subject to special pleading rules.").
12 See eg, Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 & n.87 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (11 circuits require specifici-
ty), cert denied, 470 U.S 1084 (1985). The remainder of this article cites numerous examples from
all circuits except the Federal Circuit.
" The major articles are: Marcus, supra note 6; Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1984). For a rare instance of a
district court criticizing and reluctantly following the fact-pleading standard, see Payne v. City of
LaSalle, 610 F. Supp. 606, 608-09 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
14 Roberts, Fact Pleadings Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 420 (1980).
15 "There is no frontal challenge, for example, to the wisdom of rule 8(a)'s proscription of attempts
to distinguish 'facts' from 'conclusions And it is almost as difficult to find any justification for the
piecemeal dismantling of notice pleadings." Id. (footnotes omitted).
" 297 F. Supp. 958 (D. Conn. 1968). Although Valley is not the first case to require specificity
in civil rights cases, it quickly became the most cited.
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As a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an excep-
tion has been created for cases brought under the Civil Rights
Acts. The reason for this exception is clear. In recent years there
has been an increasingly large volume of cases brought under
the Civil Rights Acts. A substantial number of these cases are
frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts; they all cause
defendants-public officials, policemen and citizens alike-
considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety.
It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and
insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still
keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims.7
Of the reasons enumerated in the Valley decision, the single most com-
mon explanation for requiring specificity is that such complaints are often
frivolous and without merit. A couple of brief quotes give the flavor. "The
purpose of the specificity requirement is to assure that civil rights ac-
tions are not frivolously brought and to enable the Court to assess whether
the action may be meritorious." 8 "The purpose of this rule is to permit
the Court to dispose of frivolous cases prior to discovery and trial." ' This
list of quotes could be multiplied a hundred-fold20
11 Id. at 960-61.
18 Shirley v. Bensalem 'Tbwnship, 501 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (footnote omitted).
But when a plaintiff under 42 U.SC. § 1983 supplies facts to support his claim, we
do not think that Conley imposes a duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts
that might turn a frivolous claim of unconstitutional official action into a substantial
one. We are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recognize the
policies behind rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not be thrown
out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of his claim.
But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the
case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist.
O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 US. 914 (1977) (citations
ommitted).
19 Skomorucha v. Wilmington Housing Auth., 504 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D. Del. 1980).
A couple outrageous examples of frivolousness are too good to pass up. The prisoner in Franklin
v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984), had filed over 100 separate actions.
A large portion of his filings have been undeniably frivolous, such as claims that his
civil rights were violated by: a television announcer calling an 18-wheel truck a
14-wheeler; a prison officer over-watering the lawn; the prison's use of aluminum pans
for baking desserts; a federal regulation requiring seat-belts for automobiles but not
for horses. The district court is understandably weary of Mr. Franklin.
Id. at 1231.
In Whiteside v. Washington, 534 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Wash. 1982), the plaintiff objected to the
lack of a jury trial in his state adjudication of a traffic offense. "The prayer for relief is 'one million
troy ounces of silver' for each asserted right of which he was deprived.... Finally, he seeks expul-
sion of the defendant judges and attorneys from the American and Washington bars." Id. at 776.
The plaintiff in Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1984), was
a recent law school graduate who wanted to play softball on a diamond the city had restricted to
hardball. A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) suit was so "frivolous on its face:' 591 F. Supp. at 1577, that
the court imposed a sanction of $50 on the impecunious graduate.
A representative sample of the cases requiring specificity to avoid frivolous suits include: Fullman
Fall, 1989]
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A second reason given for requiring specificity in civil rights com-
plaints is "to prevent public officials from being subjected to vexatious
actions."21 As one of the early opinions put it, "[flurther the court believes
that such officials should not be subjected to the inconvenience and
unpleasantness of a civil suit on the basis of vague allegations of
'willfulness', 'malice', 'wantonness' and 'illegality' inserted in the
pleadings"2 This solicitude for public officials is a continuing theme. "Our
Court has recognized that certain claims are so easily made and can
precipitate such protracted proceedings with such disruption of govern-
mental functions that, despite the general rule of Conley v. Gibson, de-
tailed fact pleadings is required to withstand a motion to dismiss' 23 This
general concern for disruption of officials is heightened when an official
claims absolute or qualified immunity.24
v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553 (11th Cir. 1984); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967); Dudosh v. City
of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849,852 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Howard v. Koch, 575 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278, 287 n. 10 (D. Colo. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part,
771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.), modified, 778 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S.
1138, dismissed a3 moot, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986); Schramm v. Krischell, 84 F.R.D. 294, 298-99
(D. Conn. 1979); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268,
1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a/fd, 595 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.) cert denied, 444 U.S 843 (1979); Flesch v. Eastern
Pa. Psychiatric Inst., 434 F. Supp. 963, 973 (E.D. Pa. 1977); MacMurry v. Board of Trustees, 428
F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1977); Pugliano v. Staziak, 231 F. Supp. 347, 355 (W.D. Pa. 1964), affd
per curiam, 345 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1965).
Light v. Blackwell, 472 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd., 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980).
22 Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (citation omitted).
23 Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). Although discussing the
claim in the context of a private defendant, another court analogized civil rights charges to fraud
in justifying specificity. "In fact, we think an allegation of racial discrimination, and the conse-
quences attendant thereto, may be as serious as accusing someone of fraud" Pettman v. United
States Chess Fed'n, 675 F. Supp. 175, 177 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). "In recent cases we have struck a
balance between these conflicting rights by requiring plaintiffs to plead facts with particularity
before they may subject public officials to trial or the vagaries of modern pretrial discovery." Jac-
quez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
A sampling of cases requiring specificity to protect officials include: Freedman v. City of Allen-
town, 853 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1988); Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1976);
Farah v. Martin, 122 F.R.D. 24, 26 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Haas v. Berrien County Sheriff's Dep't, 658
F. Supp. 877, 880 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Hodas v. Lindsay, 431 F. Supp. 637, 644 (SD.N.Y. 1977);
Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 502 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270,
274 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20, 21 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
Moreover, we have recently recognized a special tension in cases involving civil rights
complaints against public officials for actions undertaken in their official capacities.
In this context, liberal notions of notice pleading must ultimately give way to immunity
doctrines that protect us from having the work of our public officials chilled or disrupted
by participation in the trial or pretrial development of civil lawsuits. Thus, in Elliot,
we held that, to commence a lawsuit against a public official for acts for which he is
potentially immune, the complaint must allege "with particularity all material facts
on which [the claimant) contends he will establish his right to recovery, which will
include detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be
sustained.'
Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (quoting Elliot
v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985)) (emphasis and brackets by the court); accord Haas
v. Berrien County Sheriffs Dep't, 658 F. Supp. 877, 879 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Ginter v. Stallcup, 641
F. Supp. 939, 973 (E.D. Ark.) ("double standard is developing with respect to the degree of factual
specificity which must be pled in civil cases against public officials who may be entitled to absolute
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/3
PLEADING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS
A third reason courts give for holding civil rights complaints to a
higher standard of pleading is the increase in the "untold number of
claims in the federal courts, clogging the dockets and adding to an already
frustrating backlog in many courts.' 5 This increase has been cited
periodically by the Supreme Court?" Particularly galling to courts are
prisoners who file multiple claims. "Clovis Carl Green is in all likelihood
the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history. In the last decade
Green has filed between 600 and 700 complaints in federal and state
courts.'27
A fourth reason federal courts frequently require specificity in civil
rights complaints is because they do not want "the Civil Rights
Act... misused as a device.., for litigating state law claims cognizable
only in the state courts."'28 "The specificity requirement finds particular
justification in cases such as this, where plaintiffs constitutional claim
stands as a slender basis for federal jurisdiction in an otherwise routine
state court contract action "'29 Such comments echo the Supreme Court's
position in Paul v. Davi 30 where a majority of the Court refused to con-
vert all torts the state commits into civil rights actions 1
Although the district court in Valley v. Maule did not list it, a fifth
reason many courts have cited to justify specificity is lack of notice. One
court in addressing the problem stated: "[hlere again the pleading fails
to give notice, much less fair notice. It is only possible to guess or sur-
mise what plaintiffs' claims actually are in this pleading labelled
Easton v. City of Solon, 598 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
E.g, Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989) (" 'flood of frivolous litigation' ") (quoting
Brief for Petitioners Neitzke); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,556 n.16 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 27 n.16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
27 In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). There are other examples of repeat
filers. Becker v. Adams Drug Co., 819 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (10 frivolous appeals in
less than two years), cert denied, 485 U.S. 930 (1988); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.
Okla. 1985) (12 pro se in forma pauperis complaints in three years).
Rodes v. Municipal Auth., 409 F.2d 16, 17 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969).
29 Skepton v. County of Bucks, 613 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
so 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
11 Rather, he apparently believes that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
should be ex proprio vigore extend to him a right to be free of injury wherever the State
may be characterized as the tortfeasor. But such a reading would make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered by the States.
Id. at 701.
There are large number of cases that require specificity to separate the federal from state claims.
Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1983); Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir.
1971); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1,
6 (3d Cir. 1970); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964); Yglesias v.
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 201 F.2d 817, 818 (5th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bols-
inger, 211 F. Supp. 199, 201 (WD. Pa.), affd per curiam, 311 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1962), cert denied,
372 U.S. 931 (1963).
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Amended Complaint."3 2 The lack of notice comes in two forms: too much
detail and too little detail. An example of the former is the following:
"This is to avoid situations, such as is presented here, wherein the
pleading is so verbose that the Court cannot identify with clarity the
claim(s) and adjudicate such claim(s) understandingly on the merits' 3
Too little detail led one court to complain that the complaint "does not
specify who did what."34 Both kinds of detail problems lead to the same
difficulty, the defendant is unable to fashion an answer.
To summarize, federal courts have offered five groups of reasons to
justify specificity in pleading civil rights complaints: 1) to prevent frivolous
cases, 2) to protect public officials, 3) to reduce the number of cases, 4)
to detect mere state claims, and 5) to guarantee notice.
Before evaluating these five groups of reasons, it is logical to consult
the position of the United States Supreme Court. The surprising conclu-
sion is that the Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue directly,
despite the thousands of lower court cases that require specificity.
The leading Supreme Court case on pleadings is Conley v. Gibson,
which contains the oft-quoted standard that "all the Rules require is 'a
short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests"'aS The Court in the context of prisoner pro se civil rights complaints
even suggested that the Conley standard be further liberalized,36 and in
a civil rights case reiterated its adherence to the Conley standard3 7 The
32 Foreman v. General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 180 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Harrell v. Directors of Bur. of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 70 F.R.D. 444, 446 (E.D. Tenn.
1975); accord DeFina v. Latimer, 79 F.R.D. 5, 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
" Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte, 579 F. Supp. 68, 76 (D. Colo. 1984); accord
Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound, 679 F.2d 497, 504 (5th Cir. 1982); Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d
551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909, 933 (M.D.N.C. 1984)
(preliminary motions), 605 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (counterclaim); Harbert v. Rapp, 415 F.
Supp. 83, 86 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
355 U.S 41, 47 (1957) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
[Aillegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however, inartfully pleaded, are suf-
ficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with
assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less
stringent standards than form pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears "beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). The
Court continues to adhere to the Haines' standard. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108 n.16
(1976) ("no retreat from Haines u Kerner").
3' When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of
any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one.
The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant
AKRON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 23:2
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United States Supreme Court has not accepted the specificity require-
ment in civil rights cases.?
There is even a more profound reason for rejecting the specificity re-
quirement at the outset. The federal statutes do not vest any federal court
with the power to alter unilaterally the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
28 U.S.C. Section 2072 expressly states that "[t]he Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe by general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (in-
cluding proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals. 39
After recommendations from a committee,0 even the changes the Supreme
Court approves do not take effect until after Congress has had at least
seven months to revise or to stay them.'1 In other words, the inferior federal
courts are without authority to revise the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 2 and the Supreme Court has not approved amendments to rule
is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face
of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.
Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause
of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 236 (1974). This is still the Court's position. Brower v. County of
Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1382 (1989).
38 "While there may be sound policy justifications for requiring additional factual specificity
in the constitutional case, we must recognize that neither the Federal Rules nor the holdings of
the Supreme Court interpreting those Rules provide for such a disparity of treatment." Ripple &
Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case 63 NonTE DAME L. REV. 788, 808 (1988). The closest
that the Court has come to endorsing specificity is in asides. In United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court found no security and so no security fraud. In a footnote
it sustained the trial court's dismissal of a civil rights claim. "Besides the Securities Acts claims,
respondents also included a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against peti-
tioner New York State Housing Finance Agency. We agree with the District Court that this count
must be dismissed." Id. at 860 n.27.
" 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (West Supp. 1989).
40 Id. § 2073 (West Supp. 1989).
,1 Id. § 2074(a) (West Supp. 1989). Professor Stempel has argued in an analogous situation that
the Supreme Court ought not to change the standard for summary judgment and in effect amend
the rule without going through the process of receiving a report from the advisory committee and
submitting the amendment for congressional review. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgmen Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Proces%
49 OHIo ST. L.J. 95, 181-87 (1988).
" "Even if I shared that [negative] attitude [toward civil rights complaints] I could not find
statutory authority for a departure from the Rule 8 pleading standard'" Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,
532 F.2d 920, 927 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Gibbons, J., concurring and dissenting).
Once a court starts down the road of rule writing, it is forced to face a variety of new situations
that call for further rules. Consider the inventiveness of the Second Circuit in Flaherty v. Coughlin,
713 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1983), in which a prisoner claimed that he was denied a temporary release to
attend college because of his previous court victories. In reversing a summary judgment against
the prisoner by the district court, the appellate court offered further refinements on the specificity
requirement.
For example, a retaliation claim supported by specific and detailed factual allegations
which amount to a persuasive case ought usually be pursued with full discovery.
However, a complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely
be dismissed on the pleadings alone. In such a case, the prisoner has no factual basis
Fall, 1989]
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8's pleading standard. However improper the specificity requirement in
pleadings may be, the fact remains that it exists. The final portion of this
article turns to evaluating the reasons offered by the federal courts which
have so changed the federal rules.
EVALUATION
The first reason for requiring specificity was that many civil rights
complaints are frivolous. Justice Blackmun responded to that argument
as well as anyone in stating:
But I am aware of no statistics demonstrating what percentage
of § 1983 actions are bound to be meritless. Prisoners, especially
those who proceed pro se, are popular candidates for the group
likely to present consistently frivolous claims. But ever since
Jackson v. Bishop, a case in which I take pride in having par-
ticipated on the Court of Appeals, despite improvements in state
prison systems, I am not prepared to exclude the possibility that
a particular prisoner will be subject to a serious deprivation
that warrants the attention of a federal court 3
The closest statistical evidence that civil rights complaints are more
frivolous than other civil actions is that civil rights complaints are
dismissed more often before trial than other types of actions.4 Professors
Eisenberg and Schwab in a detailed study of the Central District of Califor-
nia found that a lower percentage of civil rights complaints succeeded
for the claim other than an adverse administrative decision and the costs of discovery
should not be imposed on the defendants. A third category of allegations also exists,
namely a complaint which alleges facts giving rise to a colorable suspicion of retalia-
tion. Such a claim will support at least documentary discovery.
Id. at 13.43 Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 21 (1985) (footnote omitted). Professor Eisenberg makes
the same points. "The vast majority of non-prisoner section 1983 cases involve classic rights of ob-
vious importance; the trivial claims are a sideshow.' Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Founda-
tions and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 537 (1982). "As is true of nonprisoner cases,
most prisoner section 1983 complaints were not plainly trivial assertions implicating little or no
federal interest. The largest and perhaps most controversial class of claims, that involving prison
conditions, has generated too much serious litigation to dismiss as being of little federal interest.'
Id. at 538.
"4 Professor Turner found that "a large portion of the cases are screened out and summarily
dismissed before they get under way.' Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983
Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 610, 637 (1979). His study of five federal district courts
has some interesting results. "Hardly any of the cases went to trial. Only 18 of the 664 cases studied
had either an evidentiary hearing or a trial. A grand total of forty-four court days over a two-and-
one-half-year period were spent on the cases studied." Id. at 624 (footnote omitted).
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than noncivil rights complaints. 5 The difficulty with such evidence is
that it is tainted. Precisely because courts impose higher pleading re-
quirements on civil rights complaints, fewer civil rights complaints sur-
vive to the trial stage.6
But even if the observation that civil rights complaints are more likely
to be frivolous than other types of litigation is correct, it is unclear how
special pleading rules will allow the judge to distinguish between the
worthy and the meritless complaint. Consider the typical civil rights com-
plaint of an arrest without probable cause and with excessive force. A
narrative recitation of the facts from the view of the plaintiff will rarely
assist the court in reliably determining whether the plaintiff has an
arguable civil rights claim. Factual disputes may even make the possibili-
ty of summary judgment unlikely.
There is one group of cases where sufficient factual details may help
the court to resolve a case at the pleadings stage. Suppose that a securi-
ty guard made the arrest. That raises the issue of state action. It is unlike-
ly that the plaintiff will know whether the security guard is an off-duty
police officer, or a special deputy, or has no connection with the state. 7
Yet unless there is state action, there can be no federal claim. Another
example is the classic prisoner complaint of inadequate medical atten-
tion. Unless there is "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs' 48
there is no constitutional violation. With the exception of where the omit-
ted fact would show that the plaintiff lacks a federal claim,49 it is hard
to see how requiring greater specificity will root out the frivolous claims.
A further danger in requiring facts is that the complaint will be
"argumentative, prolix, and verbose."50 A court pointedly complained
," They found that plaintiffs succeeded 82% of the time in nondefault, noncivil rights cases but
only 38% of the time in constitutional torts and 46% in nonprisoner constitutional torts. Eisenberg
& Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 674 (1987) (table
VIII). The prisoner constitutional tort success rate is 15%. Id. at 692 n.207. These number increase
significantly when counseled constitutional torts are examined. The success rates for counseled non-
prisoner constitutional torts is 56% and for counseled prisoner constitutional torts 53%. Id. at 693
(table XVIII).
46 "In cases disposed of by motion before trial, constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in nine
percent of the cases while non-civil rights plaintiffs prevailed 42% of the time:' Eisenberg & Schwab,
supra note 45, at 678 (footnotes omitted).
" The case of Rodes v. Municipal Authority, 409 F.2d 16 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 861 (1969), is an example of where the failure to provide factual data probably indicated a lack
of a federal claim. The plaintiff claimed that the municipal water authority was denying her water
rights. There had been previous litigation in state court which she had lost.
,8 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
"See Marcus, supra note 6, at 463.
'o Newman v. Massachusetts, 115 F.R.D. 341, 343 (D. Mass. 1987).
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about "garbage-can complaints with their appended scraps of newspaper
clippings, magazine articles, correspondence, and an unbelievable varie-
ty of other unnecessary and irrelevant matters' 51 Yet such pleadings are
the result of requiring facts.
The position being defended here is not that facts need not be pleaded,
but rather that no special standard should be applied to civil rights com-
plaints. Just as it is insufficient to plead merely that the defendant
"deprived the plaintiff of a legally protected right," so also is it insuffi-
cient to alleged merely that the defendant "deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutionally protected right." In other words, the forms accompany-
ing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply not only to
negligence cases but also to civil rights cases 2
The following two cases demonstrate the unfortunate impact of the
specificity requirement in civil rights cases. The first case is United States
u City of Philadelphia3 in which the United States Department of Justice
accused the Philadelphia Police Department of widespread patterns of
civil rights violations, sanctioned and even promoted by city officials.
Although most of the dispute concerned whether Justice Department of-
ficials had standing to raise constitutional rights of private individuals,
a significant portion of the trial and appellate opinions focused on the
part of the complaint alleging racial discrimination in programs receiv-
ing federal funds. The United States' theory was basically that some un-
constitutional practices had a disproportionate impact on blacks and
Hispanics. The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
funding allegations because of a lack of specificity.
Unlike many pro se civil rights complaints, this thirty five-page com-
plaint was signed by the Attorney General and five other officials of the
Justice Department. At the time the trial court dismissed the suit on
the pleadings, the United States had already filed 836 pages of answers
"1 Bey v. Schneider Sheet Metal, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 319, 324 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
52 Form 9 is typical. After an allegation of jurisdiction, only the following is required:
2. On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts,
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing
said highway.
3. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was otherwise
injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great pain of body and
mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of
one thousand dollars.
FED. R. Cw. P. form 9. The final paragraph is the demand.
482 F. Supp. 1248, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 644
F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1981).
*4 482 F. Supp. at 1277.
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to interrogatories, but the court of appeals explicitly refused to consider
the government's submission. 5 Instead the original panel found the com-
plaint deficient because it "provides an inadequate basis for us to deter-
mine whether its allegations were frivolous or serious' 5 6 In other words,
this court would require that the plaintiff not only avoid frivolousness
in the complaint but also negate the possibility of frivolousness. Such
reasoning led the dissent to accuse the majority of "a barely-masked con-
tempt for the civil rights guarantees' 5
7
The more recent case of Patton v. Przybylski58 again had the appellate
court sustaining a trial court's dismissal on the pleadings. Here Alex-
ander Patton was arrested and held eight days before being presented
to a magistrate when a mistake in identity was discovered. There was
a valid arrest warrant for an Alexander Patton of the same race and age
but with a different date of birth and state of residence. Patton brought
a civil rights action against the sheriff of Cook County, where he was
confined most of the eight days, and against three individual police of-
ficers. The clearest disagreement between the majority and the dissent
was over the liability of the sheriff. The majority found that "[t]he pro-
blem in this case is that the complaint fails to connect these problems
with Sheriff Elrod... Patton must find out who was actually responsi-
ble for the delay in bringing him before Judge Crilly or some other
magistrate, and sue that person, and he hasn't done this."5 9 The dissent,
after adding a few humanizing facts (Patton was beaten severely and lost
his job), would apply the usual notice pleading standard of Conley v.
Gibson.
Despite these well-settled principles, the majority-with only
the complaint before it-determines the reasonableness of the
particular arresting officer's conduct, the credibility of the
allegation that the arresting officer caused the plaintiffs fur-
ther detention, and the reasonableness of the conduct of the of-
ficers who held the plaintiff for eight days without justifying
their actions to a magistrate. It dismisses, by pure ipse dixit,
the complaint's allegation that this lengthy detention was part
of a "custom, practice and policy" of the Cook County Sheriffs
Office. Further proceedings may well establish that the plain-
tiff cannot maintain this cause of action. Perhaps there was no
willful violation of his federal rights, no racial animus, no
s 644 F.2d at 206. The dissent found this refusal to consider post-pleading submissions contrary
to Third Circuit precedent. Id. at 210-11 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
Id. at 205 n.28 (original panel opinion). To which the dissent answers, "the federal govern-
ment cannot be denominated an irresponsible, unstable, frivolous or over litigious plaintiff." Id. at
212 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
" Id. at 211 (Gibbons, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
822 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
"' Id. at 701.
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federally-forbidden pattern, practice or policy. Perhaps the same
procedures would have been followed if a Northbrook housewife
had been traveling on that road that night. PerhapsP0
The majority in Patton disposed of the entire case against both the
officers and superior. In City of Philadelphia the entire case only involved
the governmental entity and superiors. The more common situation in
such cases is to dismiss the governmental entity or superior and leave
the individual officers in the action. But consider the Catch 22 situation.
Assume a plaintiff has been subjected to a wanton beating by the police.
Until the victim has obtained, through discovery, the official disciplinary
file of the officer or officers involved, how is the victim able to allege in
his or her complaint evidentiary facts (as contrasted with ultimate or con-
clusory facts) to support a charge of knowing acquiescence against the
employing city? 1 The action against the individuals continues, so the
court has often not even disposed of the entire case by imposing this heavy
pleading burden.
The second reason the court in Valley gave for requiring specificity
was to prevent burdening public officials. This reason properly understood
does not bring anything new to pleading analysis as it is hornbook law
that a complaint which on its face has a defect is subject to a motion to
dismiss. "[Miost courts have ruled that if a pleading contains a defect
and fails to go on to show how the defect is avoided, the pleading is sub-
ject to a challenge for failure to state a claim or defense.""s Consider a
60 Id. at 702 (Ripple, J., dissenting). Judge Ripple has been more sympathetic to the specificity
requirement in an article. Ripple & Saalman, supra note 38, at 807-09, 817.
11 Payne v. City of LaSalle, 610 F. Supp. 606,607-08 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (footnote omitted). The Third
Circuit varies the specificity depending on "whether the plaintiff is in a position to know or acquire
the relevant factual details" before discovery. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667
(3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). Because there is no respondeat superior liability
under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove policy or custom to justify holding the governmental en-
tity or superior liable. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
A more poetic court discussed this problem of specificity in the employment discrimination context.
Standard's real argument is that the complaint asks the company to investigate a wide
range of employment practices and to evaluate discrimination on every conceivable
basis, with few guideposts to help it pinpoint exactly which policies or procedures are
under attack. In short the complaint resembles "a shotgun blast fired while leaning
out a window." Nevertheless, to complete this metaphor, we believe Rule 8 only requires
the complaint to describe the direction in which the gun is pointed, and not to detail
the area of impact. The pleadings are not designed to carry the burden of formulating
the issues and advising the adverse party of the facts involved. Depositions and discovery
procedures perform that function.
McCray v. Standard Oil Co., 76 F.R.D. 490, 496 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (quoting EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co.,
556 F.2d 787, 796 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977)).
42 J. FRFEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 5, § 5.15, at 276 (footnote omitted).
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suit against a judge or prosecutor who enjoys immunity in his official
capacity. "I would conclude that no claim is stated against officials who
hold positions which enjoy absolute immunity absent a statement of suf-
ficient facts which, if true, would demonstrate the absence of immuni-
ty "'63 This is no different from a complaint which on its face shows that
the statute of limitations has run out. When the defendant moves to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must produce sufficient
facts to show that the time limit does not apply to his claim. For absolute
immunity there should not be a need for a special rule.
There is also the qualified or good faith immunity the Supreme Court
has given to most executive officials. Furthermore, the Court has spoken
clearly about how to handle the pleading problem in stating: "[glovern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofaras their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known"" The executive defendant should raise this
affirmative defense in a motion for summary judgment. "Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed."6 5 An alert plaintiff may want to plead the violation of an objec-
tive standard, but there is. nothing in the Court's analysis requiring
particularityse in the original complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, a plaintiff only must present sufficient evidence that the defend-
ant violated a known constitutional standard to avoid summary judg-
ment. Ultimately the Supreme Court's position is to defer to Congress.
"It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has become
too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if so, what remedial
action is appropriate."6 7
Even if the Supreme Court had not spoken on how to proceed with
absolute and qualified immunities, the requirement of specificity in
63 Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring specially).
Judge Higginbotham was unable to join the majority's theory of particularity. "I do not know where
we find the authority to add the requirement that claims against officials who enjoy immunity from
suit shall be pled with particularity." Id.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S, 800, 818 (1982).
" Id.
The Court indirectly admitted that its solution may still impose a considerable burden on
officials. "Many [§ 1983 suits] are marginal and some are frivolous. Yet even when the risk of ultimate
liability is negligible, the burden of defending such lawsuits is substantial" Town of Newton v. Rumery,
480 U.s 386, 395 (1987) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). In Rumery the Court went on to uphold
an agreement between the prosecutor not to prosecute and the defendant not to file a section 1983
action. Id. at 387.
87 Tower v. Glover, 467 U.s 914, 923 (1984). The quote refers to immunity, but the same logic
ought to apply to pleadings requirements.
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pleadings against officials is hardly compelled by inner logic. First, il-
legal and unconstitutional actions by executives did not cease when
George III's rule was removed from the United States. Second, this writer
is unaware of any systematic survey indicating that large numbers of
qualified people avoid public office because of fear of being sued. Third,
governmental units which often pay the legal expenses of their officials
are hardly being driven to bankruptcy in defending these actions. Even
if significant resources are expended in defending such suits, would the
nation be better off with meritorious civil rights complaints against of-
ficials being dismissed?
The third reason justifying specificity in pleading civil rights com-
plaints was the increase in the number of cases. A superficial view of
the numbers does bear this out. Since 1970 the number of prisoner and
nonprisoner civil rights cases has increased dramatically. The number
of prisoner civil rights cases filed annually in the United States district
courts has grown from 2793 in 1970 to 24,421 in 1988.5 There has been
a similar growth in nonprisoner filings from 3985 in 1970 to 19,323 in
1988.P9 For the most recent year only the prisoner civil rights filings are
up over the previous year. While the overall number of filings in the federal
district courts was nearly constant (up 0.2% from 1987 to 1988), the
number of prisoner civil rights filings was up 3% while nonprisoner flings
were down 2.4% in the same period?0 A wide variety of actions are
classified by the Administrative Office as civil rights. Nearly one-half
are employment discrimination cases. "[Ahn educated guess would be that
section 1983 cases constitute only about one-third, and certainly not more
than one-half of the cases the Administrative Office classifies as civil
" The actual numbers are:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
2793 6606 13,000 19,488 20,842 23,716 24,421
Source: ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS., 1971 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 263 (table C2); 1977
id. at 189 (table 11); 1982 id. at 99 (table 17); 1988 id. at 185 (table C-2A).
69 The complete figures are:
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
3985 10,392 12,944 19,553 20,128 19,805 19,323
Source: same as previous footnote.
70 ADmw TNISRA~E OFF.U.S CTS., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DmECTOR 185 (table C-2A). Another
explanation for the increase in the number of prisoner cases is the dramatic increase in the number
of prisoners in the United States. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1033 (1984) (app. C).
But the increase in the number of filings outstrips the increased prison population. Id. at 1034 (app.
D).
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rights cases." '71 If federal courts feel overwhelmed by civil rights cases,
they should direct their criticism at Congress which created the new civil
rights actions in the 1960's, rather than at the plaintiffs who are utiliz-
ing the tools Congress gave them. The rate of increase in nonprisoner
constitutional torts actually has been less than the overall rate of increase
of civil cases in the federal district courts since 197572
Despite the absolute increase in the number of prisoner civil rights
cases filed, a detailed study comparing prisoner civil rights complaints
with the number of prisoners and the general increase in litigation yields
a very different result. "Taken together, prison population growth and
the national growth in litigiousness might explain all the growth in
prisoner civil rights filings over the ten years covered'
73
Congress has responded in several ways to this increase. Beyond the
increase in the number of federal judges which is helpful for the general
increase in case loads, there are two specific statutes that assist the district
courts in dealing with prisoner civil rights complaints. The more impor-
tant is the provision allowing the judge to assign most prisoner civil rights
cases to magistrates. "[A] judge may also designate a magistrate to con-
duct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge
of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposi-
tion, by a judge of the court,... of prisoner petitions challenging condi-
tions of confinement' 74 The district courts have used this provision ex-
tensively. In the report for fiscal 1988, there were 15,819 referrals to
magistrates of prisoner condition of confinement casesP3 The second
statute allows the judge to stay a prisoner civil rights complaint for ninety
days, during which time the prisoner must utilize the administrative pro-
cedures available in the prison7 In addition to the two prisoner-oriented
7 Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 533. The actual numbers for nonprisoner filings by categories
for the last four years are:
1985 1986 1987 1988
voting 281 194 214 347
employment 8,082 9,174 8,986 8,563
accommodations 253 230 322 322
welfare 180 184 158 129
other 10,757 10,366 10,105 9,962
ADMammTEAV OFF. U.S CTS, 1988 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 185 (table C-2A).
7' Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 45, at 666 (table III).
73 Id. at 667.
74 28 U.&C. § 636(bX1)(B) (1982).
7 ADmNsTRATIvE OFF. U.S. CTS., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 34 (table 11).
7' 42 U.SC. § 1977e (1982). See generally Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State
Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935 (1986).
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statutes, many in forma pauperis civil rights complaints are dismissed
quickly, even before any process is served on the defendant, "if [the court
is) satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."77
Whatever the speed of resolution and burden of civil rights cases under
the current pleading standards,78 if judges were no longer able to re-
quire specificity in pleading civil rights complaints9 because of the
"7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). The Supreme Court has recently held "that a complaint filed in
forma pauperis is not automatically frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d) because it fails to
state a claim." Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1989). Only when the complaint "lacks
even an arguable basis in law," id. at 1833, should the court dismiss under § 1915(d).
There is considerable criticism of the quality of this evaluation. This screening is done often
by a writ clerk "directly out of law school and without guidance or training." Turner, supra note
44, at 620 (1979). "[Mlany of the court personnel who read, screen, and recommend rulings on prisoner
complaints are quite cynical about the cases. It is not an exaggeration to say that they do not always
give the benefit of the doubt to an unclear prisoner allegation?' Id. at 649 n. 18 6 . "The judges usual-
ly follow the clerk's recommendations.' Id. at 621.
78 The scholars are in disagreement about the burden civil rights cases impose on trial courts.
The impact of prisoner section 1983 cases on the efficient functioning of the federal
district courts is not nearly as great as the number might indicate. The burden is
relatively light because such a large proportion of the cases are screened out and sum-
marily dismissed before they get under way, because court appearances and trials are
rare, and because prisoner cases not particularly complex as compared to other types
of federal litigation.
Id at 637 (footnote omitted). Although the Turner quote is directed to prisoner section 1983 cases,
the same logic applies to all civil rights cases where the courts impose heavier pleading burdens.
But Professor Turner then goes on to observe:
On the other hand, pro se litigation is undoubtedly a problem for judicial administra-
tion. The burden on the court is mainly in screening such pro se cases, not in trying
them. Relatively few prison cases can be settled, primarily because meaningful negotia-
tions between prisoners acting pro se and states' attorneys are practically impossible.
Thus, unlike other civil litigation, some court action is required on almost all the cases.
Id.
Eisenberg and Schwab's careful study of an individual federal district court suggest that con-
stitutional tort cases survive longer than nonconstitutional cases. The median survival time for
constitutional torts was 10.8 months and for nonconstitutional torts 8.2 months. What is even more
striking is that 10% of the constitutional torts remained after 36 months, while 10% of the non-
constitutional torts remained for 25 months. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 45, at 673 (table VI).
They also discovered that constitutional tort cases had higher percentage of interrogatories, hear-
ings, pretrial conferences and depositions than nondefault, nonconstitutional cases. Id. at 674 (table
VIII). "We conclude that the average constitutional tort case is more burdensome than the average
non-civil rights case." Id. at 675.
"9 Another indication of the preference for factual specificity is found in the form suggested by
a committee of the United States Judicial Conference. The committee suggested that prisoners be
required to use the following form.
IV. Statement of Claim
State here as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each defendant
is involved. Include also the names of other persons involved, dates and places. Do not
give any legal argument or cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number
of related claims, number and set forth each claim in a separate paragraph. Use as
much space as you need. Attach extra sheet if necessary.
PRISON CiviL RIGHTS COMMrrrEE, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 92 (1980) (form 1).
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number of such claims, then the real (and often unarticulated) reason
could emerge. "Procedural rules are not crafted in a vacuum. Decisions
about procedure are influenced by judgments about the disputants, the
dispute, and the proper role of government in responding to conflicts."80
Professor Marcus has speculated that the deeper reason for specificity
in civil rights complaints is judicial hostility to the claim or the litigant.'
His direct words about the nature of civil rights claims speak clearly.
"The most common focus for disapproval are civil rights cases, but such
claims should not be disfavored. To the contrary, they are central to our
concept of liberty'8 2 To articulate this "reason" is to see immediately
its emptiness.
More difficult to discuss is the concern about the nature of the litigant.
There is a small number of litigants who repeatedly file meritless cases.3
Since courts usually exclude evidence of prior acts to prove character,84
is it logical to exclude the history of previous pleadings? Does that mean
that a court is helpless to stem the "torrential stream of written ver-
biage"?"5 The correct approach is to impose monetary sanctions on the
plaintiffs able to pay' and other restrictions on those unable to pay8 7 who
repeatedly file complaints found to be meritless.
The fourth justification for requiring specificity in pleading civil rights
claims was to distinguish between federal constitutional claims and non-
8o Resnik, supra note 70, at 842.
81 Marcus, supra note 6, at 471-79.
82 Id. at 471.
81 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
" FED. R. Evm. 404(a).
8 Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D. Okla. 1985), modified, 795 F.2d 900 (10th
Cir. 1986). Cotner had already filed 12 unsuccessful pro se suits for which the court had imposed
stricter pleadings requirements for him. Cotner's latest effort was to enlist seven fellow prisoners
to file identical complaints about prison conditions. These complaints on their faces alleged serious
violations at least worthy of further investigation. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed them also.
In doing so the court seemed to fulfill its own warning. "He must hope that in that sea of frivolous
prisoner complaints, his lone, legitimate cry for relief will be heard by a clerk, magistrate or judge
grown weary of battling the waves of frivolity.' Id. The judge here imposed a fine of $1000 and bar-
red Cotner from filing further suits until he had paid the fine. Id. at 1099.
Accordingly, appellant is ordered to pay appellees double costs and the amount of $500
as "just damages" on this appeal. Furthermore, the clerk of this court is directed to
accept no further papers from appellant, who does not have in forma pauperis status
in this court, on any matter until appellant provides the court with adequate proof
of compliance with the sanctions imposed in this case and in prior cases cited above.
Becker v. Adams Drug Co., 819 F.2d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. App. P. 38),
cert denied, 485 U.S 930 (1988).
87 Petitioner may not file any civil action without leave of court. In seeking leave of court,
petitioner must certify that the claims he wishes to present are new claims never before
raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal court. Upon a failure to certify or
upon a false certification, petitioner may be found in contempt of court and punished
accordingly.
In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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federal question state claims. This line of analysis is really not any dif-
ferent from the frivolousness worry. Another way of saying that a claim
is frivolous is to say that it ought to be brought in state court and not
in federal court as a civil rights complaint. So there is no need for separate
discussion of this justification.
The fifth justification for requiring specificity is lack of notice, that
the complaint fails to provide the defendant with a clear notion of the
nature of the complaint. Such criticism goes to the heart of Conley's so-
called notice pleading requirement. A complaint that fails to provide
enough information to enable the defendant to draft an answer is defec-
tive. However, the correct remedy is a motion for a more definite state-
ment rather than dismissal." If the plaintiff is unable to comply with
such a motion, then the court is justified in dismissing the action. If the
defendant is able to frame an intelligent answer, then the complaint has
fulfilled its function in the federal system, and nothing more should be
demanded of it. Further information should be found through discovery!9
Although not necessarily part of the specificity requirement, there
is one final aspect to be considered-sanctions under rule 1190 Rule 11
sanctions are imposed on civil rights complaints more frequently than
on other types of litigation, with the possible exception of income tax
litigation?1 A major study offers a revealing theory to explain the disparity.
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
Paragraph 14, though skeletal, is pleaded so as reasonably to allow defendant Proulx
to respond, knowing whether or not he was involved in any or none of the incidents
there charged. Under federal notice pleading no greater detail seems to be required,
and the parties must be left to other pretrial devices to expedite and simplify the
proceedings.
Cox v. Maine Maritime Academy, 122 F.R.D. 115, 117 (D. Me. 1988) (footnote omitted; citations
omitted).
oFED. R. Civ. P 11
81 "Although almost every major lawsuit now includes at least the threat of a rule 11 motion,
sanctions are more likely to be imposed in public interest litigation, such as civil rights and employ-
ment discrimination cases, than in other types of federal litigation." Note, Plausible Pleadings:
Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REV. 630, 631 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
"The only cases in which sanctions are more frequently imposed than in civil rights cases are those
challenging federal income taxation." Id. at 631 n.7. "[R]eported cases suggest that amended rule
11 is being used disproportionately against plaintiffs, particularly in certain types of litigation such
as civil rights, employment discrimination, securities fraud cases brought by investors, and antitrust
cases brought by small companies.' Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988).
One study even found "that the decisional differences between relatively frequent and infrequent
sanctioners appeared primarily in their reactions to the civil rights claims. S KASsIN, AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONs 39 (1985). "[Jludges who have faced a large number of claims arising
under the civil rights statutes are among the more active users of rule 11*" Id. at x.
However, a considerably different picture emerges when the study includes all cases (not just
reported or electronically available ones), precisely what was attempted for one year in the district
courts of Third Circuit. AMERICAN JUDICATuRE SocIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSION: THE REPORT OF THE 18
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One possible explanation is that perhaps a good deal of the in-
court rule 11 experience that distinguishes the frequent sanc-
tioners from the infrequent sanctioners is in the area of civil
rights litigation; indeed, Medina et al.'s review indicates that
21 percent of all sanctions motions filed since August 1983 were
in civil rights cases. If so, then perhaps judges who have been
confronted with a sizable number of civil rights suits, many of
which are pro se, have developed, as a result of that experience
a generally negative expectation concerning the merit of these
actions?2
It is hard to quarrel with the "reasonable inquiry" and "not... im-
proper purpose" requirements of rule 11. It is the synergistic combina-
tion of rule 11 and the specificity requirement that is troubling. Consider
a court which requires specificity in pleading civil rights complaints and
then imposes rule 11 sanctions after dismissing the complaint? If re-
TasRD CIRcuIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 56-57 (1989). That study
found that sanctioning activity for civil rights cases involved "only two thirds of one percent of such
cases'" Id. at 61. This rate of activity was not much different from other civil cases. "Requests for
sanctions in civil rights cases constituted only a slightly larger slice of our pie (24/132 or 18.2%)
than one would expect on the basis of civil filings in this circuit (16% of civil filings in the period
ending June 30, 1988)." Id. at 69 (citation omitted). But sanctions were imposed on civil rights plain-
tiffs at a much higher rate than on other plaintiffs.
Yet, plaintiffs (and/or their counsel) were sanctioned on motion in civil rights (including
employment discrimination) cases in our survey at a rate (8/17 or 47.1%) that is con-
siderably higher than the rate (6/71 or 8.45%) for plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases.
This finding is statistically significant at a level of less than 1%. Id. & n.19.
See Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 490-92 (1988-89) (ex-
haustive summary of books and articles finding rule 11 applied to civil rights litigation).
"S. KASsIw, supra note 91, at 39. Example of civil rights cases in which sanctions were imposed
include: Woods v. Princeton Packaging, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. Wash. 1987); Martin v. Supreme
Court, 644 F. Supp. 1537 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Servs., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13
(N.D Ill. 1984), aftd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
A recent, thoughtful opinion explores this very issue.
In reviewing the sufficiency of civil rights complaints, we cannot avoid noting the dif-
ficulty plaintiffs and their counsel may have in attempting to accommodate this court's
requirement of factual specificity with amended Fed.R.Civ.P 11. That rules equates
the signature of an attorney or party signing a pleading with a certificate that the
pleading "is well grounded in fact," and requires plaintiffs to make "some prefiling
inquiring into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by
the law." Fed.R.Civ.P11 Advisory Committee's Notes concerning 1983 Amendment.
However, the Advisory Committee has explained that, "Itihe standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances." Id. One of the circumstances to be considered
is whether the plaintiff is in a position to know or acquire the relevant factual details.
The administratrix in this action is in a particularly difficult position because Stierheim
is dead and the results of defendants' investigations into the incident are apparently
not a matter of public record. Defendants have not yet responded to plaintiffs inter-
rogatories and her requests for production of documents. We must take these factors
in consideration in determining whether, at this preliminary stage, we can hold as a
matter of law that plaintiffis allegations cannot reasonably be read to state a claim
under section 1983.
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied4 109 S, Ct. 1338 (1989).
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quiring specificity is improper, then adding rule 11 sanctions is adding
insult to injury.?
FINAL THOUGHTS
Ultimately, the validity of the five reasons federal courts have offered
to justify specificity in pleadings civil rights complaints rests on how the
tension between speed of resolution (efficiency) and accuracy of resolu-
tion (truth) is resolved. No system can opt for either value exclusively.
But a judgment after only a complaint has been filed is a significant tilt
to efficiency at the expense of truth. The further worry is that "the judge
can more easily eliminate not only claims that she finds unpersuasive
in the instant case but also legal rights with which she is unsym-
pathetic.""5
Even if the judges who dismiss civil rights complaints for lack of
specificity are not unsympathetic to such claims, they may have adopted
the attitude of the life-wearied Qoheleth who concludes, "What now is
has already been; what is to be, already is."" s They would do well to
meditate on the words of Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit.
We recognize that prisoner complaints often seem annoying and
insubstantial, and that the volume of such complaints faced by
most district courts would try the patience of Job. Job-like pa-
tience, however, should be the judicial benchmark in this area.
Technical rigidity in reviewing pleadings must be eschewed, and
we must remain extremely tolerant of the juristically unlearn-
ed as they seek to articulate their belief that they have suffered
deprivations of constitutional rights
7
Judge Jack Weinstein, long-time chief judge of the Eastern District
of New York, in an address cast the specificity problem in a larger context.
In more recent years the slackened growth in our productivity
and the relative weakening of our economic power vis-a-vis that
of other nations has lent weight to the increasing pressure of
There are special problems with imposing sanctions on pro se, in forma pauperis, incarcerated
plaintiffs. Often the ordinary monetary sanction is ineffective. "Other sanctions, such as refusing
to accept further filings, must be considered." Patterson v. Patterson, 808 F.2d 357, 358 (5th Cir.
1986) (per curiam).
" Stempel, supra note 41, at 166. Professor Stempel's observation was in criticizing the trilogy
of summary judgment decisions of the Supreme Court: Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317 (1986); Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 US. 574 (1986).
Ecclesiastes 3:5.
Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. 1976).
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conservatives to reduce access to our courts with the argument
that the transactional costs are too heavy to bear. Increasing
disparity of income has coincided with greater reluctance to con-
tinue the struggle for equality in the courthouse. The slowed
growth in the economy coupled with the increasing amount of
litigation has caused problems since the early 1970s, and one
remedy for these problems has been to restrict access to the
courts. Belief in broad pleadings has declined. Special or more
rigid rules of pleading have been developed for certain types
of cases, such as civil rights, antitrust, securities litigation, and
now RICO claims. It is believed by some that specificity in
pleadings helps reduce the costs of discovery and trial?'
Although Judge Weinstein seems to be distancing himself from these
sentiments, he nonetheless gives voice to the concerns of some proponents
of specificity. But this rationale does not withstand analysis. The trans-
actional costs of several thousand civil rights cases annually hardly make
the United States noncompetitive in the world markets. Not even the
most troglodytic judge would argue that there is too much equality and
too little inequality in the United States today.
I ultimately conclude that requiring specificity is not a very good way
to distinguish wheat from chaff as both are likely to be blown away in
the hurricane of supposed efficiency.
" Weinstein, The Ghost of Process PasL The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Erie, 54 BRoOKLYN L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1988) (footnote omitted).
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